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OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND LIQUIDITY: THE CASE OF 

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR IN MALAYSIA 

from 
Tan Seow Lin 
This paper aims to present evidences that liquidity is significantly determined 
by ownership concentration besides than firm size, leverage and growth 
opportunities. The study focuses on the relations between ownership concentration 
and liquidity of Malaysian public listed firms in the industrial sector from year 2006 
to 2010. The sector was selected due to its significance as the economy's indicator 
since Malaysia is developing and advancing into further stage of economy. The 
findings yielded that both insiders blockholders and institutional blockholders shown 
a ~ifferent results when measured by different liquidity measurements composed of 
dollar volume, turnover and bid-ask spread. This paper contribute to the existing 
literatures in the corporate governance field as there is limited empirical which study 
on Malaysia. Meanwhile, policy and law makers can use this study as a guideline to 
improve the firms' capital structure as well as the economic conditions which were 
both influenced by corporate liquidity. 
ABSTRAK 

KONSENTRASI PEMILIKAN DAN KECAIRAN: KES SEKTOR 

INDUSTRIAL DI MALAYSIA 

Oleh 
Tan Seow Lin 
Kertas kerja in bertujuan untuk membuktikan bahawa konsentrasi pemilikan 
adalah salah satu faktor penentu kecairan selain daripada saiz firma, leverage dan 
peluang pertumbuhan. Kajian ini fokus kepada hubungan antara konsentrasi 
pemilikan dan kecairan firma awam Malaysia dalam sektor industrial dari tahun 
2006 hingga 20 1 o. Sektor ini dipilih disebabkan oleh kepentingannya sebagai 
indikator ekonomi sejak Malaysia semakin berkembang dan maju ke tahap ekonomi 
yang lebih tinggi. Analisis menunjukkan bahawa blockholder dalaman dan 
blockholder institusi mempunyai keputusan yang berbeza bergantung kepada ukuran 
kecairan yang berlainan, iaitu volum dolar, kadar pengantian dan tawar-minta 
penyebaran. Kertas kerja ini akan menyumbang kepada kajian empirikal sedia ada 
yang berkaitan dengan bidang tadbir urus korporat kerana kajian terhadap firma 
Malaysia adalah terhad. Selain itu, pembuat polisi dan undang-undang boleh 
menggunakan kajian ini sebagai satu garis pand)..lan untuk memperbaiki serta 
meningkatkan struktur modal firma dan juga keadaan ekonomi di mana kedua-dua 
ini dipengaruhi oleh kecairan syarikat. 
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1.1 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance has always been one of the hottest and favourite topic of 
scholars in United States and Europe. However, with the economy's growth and 
liberalization, it has also spread to the developing and emerging countries such as 
China, India, Thailand and Malaysia. Today, the governance quality has become the 
key factor for survival and also a source of competitive advantage, in addition to 
playing a main role in influencing the company capability to raise fund from capital 
markets. 
La Porta et al. (2000) defined corporate governance as a set of instruments 
which outside investors guard themselves against expropriation by the insiders. It 
eeks to protect shareholder rights, enhance transparent exposures and also to assist 
in the processes of board effectiveness so that to reduce the problem of information 
asymmetry. Hence, it is essential to have a better quality and quantity of information 
made accessible to investor (PrasalUla & Menon, 2011). Corporate governance 
mechanisms and structures differ across countries and industry sectors due to the 
different environmental settings. Maher & Andersson (1999) classified corporate 
governance systems into two categories which are outsider systems characterized by 
widely dispersed ownership and insider systems characterized by ownership 
concentration. 
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The issues of corporate governance occur due to the separation of ownership 
and control has been one of the most debatable issues in the corporate finance field 
which lead to many studies done on the relations between managerial ownership and 
finn performance such as McConnell & Servaes (1990), Hermalin & Weisbach 
(1991) and Morck et a1. (1998). Ownership structure is regarded as an essential 
instrument to resolve interest conflicts between shareholders and managers in 
corporate governance. Therefore, Jensen & Meckling (1976) developed a theory of 
the corporate ownership structure known as the agency theory which guides the 
framework for ownership-performance studies. 
Although there is still an uncertainty and doubt as to whether institutional 
ownership plays a part in the development of financial market due to the high levels 
of ownership concentration and weak protection, it does improves corporate 
governance and also increases the firm's exposure level in emerging markets 
accorcting to LaPorta et a1. (1998) and Gjerde et a1. (2011). 
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1.1.1 Corporate Governance Problem 
A: Managerial Agency Costs 





Public firms with full ownership separation have no dominant shareholder. 
With shareholders dispersed, the tasks of keeping managers working primarily in 
shareholders' interests becomes critical. This diffuse ownership (Figure 1) is layered 
over a basic principal agent problem: the stockholders' agenda- typically maximizing 
shareholder value can be at odds with managers' agendas. In that setting, aligning 
their interest become the typical problem of corporate governance. Agency costs 
incurred due to principal-agent problem. 
1.1.2 Ownership Structure 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) found that an increase in managerial ownership 
plays the role of firms device mechanism as the internal monitoring. The relationship 
between ownership structures and corporate governance differ among the countries 
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according to Thomsen & Pedersen (2000) in their study including 12 European 
countries. Ownership concentration model is believed to be a proxy for tendency to 
monitor organizational managers which also differ widely across countries (La Porta 
e aI., 1999; Ramaswamy et aI., 2002). 
Generally, the ownership level variables in a firm are insiders, non-insiders and 
others while the concentration measures are insider block holders and institutional 
block holders. The study by Dittmar et al. (2002) provides strong evidences on the 
importance of corporate governance in determining corporate liquidity. Better 
governed companies are found to have higher stock liquidity in a study done by 
Prasanna & Menon (2011). 
1.2 Corporate Liquidity 
Liquidity is defined as the ability of converting an asset into cash which means 
the capability of a company to meet its short term commitments. Short term implies 
the commitments which will mature within one accounting year. The most liquid 
asset among other types of assets is the cash since it can be used easily and instantly 
to finance company's operating activities. 
Corporate liquidity are affected by corporate governance due to two reasons. 
Firstly, poor governance increases information asymmetries between insiders, 
including managers, controlling shareholders, informed traders and the outside 
shareholders which lead to illiquidity of assets. Secondly, corporate governance 
influences liquidity as it is easier for the insiders to take advantage of private 
information when investor interests are poorly protected (Chung et aI., 2006). 
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Nevertheless, as compared to other detenninants such as size, finn value, 
growth opportunities, corporate liquidity has been receiving little attention from 
researchers as possible detenninant of ownership concentration in the corporate 
finance field. The stock's liquidity is usually measured by using the bid-ask spread 
which is a direct cost of transacting. Quoted depth is also a part of the stock market 
quote and adverse selection risk is managed by adjusting both spread and depth. This 
method of measurement is used in most of the empirical investigations (Sarin et aI., 
1999). Liquidity measures include intraday measures of price impact (Amihud et aI., 
1986), realized spread and effective spread in addition to daily measures of turnover. 
1.2.1 Liquidity Hypotheses 
Based on previous literatures such as Rubin (2006) and Ghabri (2010), there are 
two hypotheses to examine the concepts of liquidity, which are adverse selection 
hypothesis and trading hypothesis. 
A. Adverse Selection Hypothesis 
Adverse selection component of bid-ask spreads is due to infonnation 
asymmetry between dealers and infonned traders (Fehle, 2004). Adverse selection 
hypothesis states that infonned shareholders have superior infonnation compared to 
outside shareholders where infonnation asymmetry arises leading to a decline in 
liquidity (Kyle, 1985; Easley & O'Hara, 1987). According to Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), controlling shareholders at 10% threshold are 
considered as insiders while institutions which do not have the same access to 
private infonnation compared to insiders can construct an infonnational advantage 
SIPage 
by utilizing the economies of scale in infonnation acquisition and possessing. Hence, 
following the SEC definition of insiders, this study focuses on controlling 
shareholder ownership for Malaysia finns. 
B. Trading Hypothesis 
Trading hypothesis states that when the turnover of investors' portfolios are 
more often, transactions costs are reduced leading to an increase in liquidity. Large 
stakes by block holders lessen the availability of floating shares, therefore the 
monitoring role of insiders' block holders has a high cost in tenus of market 
liquidity. When a finn's ownership is concentrated, there are fewer trade, therefore 
free-float is limited and liquidity is reduced (Demsetz, 1968). Ownership structure 
may affect liquidity through the production of infonnation. Moreover, ownership 
concentration decreases the benefits of monitoring the finn by stock market 
participants, thereby reducing the amount of public infonnation available about the 
firm (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1993). 
1.3 Theoretical Background & Conceptual Framework 
1.3.1. Theoretical Background 
The basis of the corporate governance studies is agency theory which is 
introduced by Jensen & Meckling (1976) as a framework and guidance for scholars 
in their literatures. Agency theory is concerned with conflicts of interest between 
agents and principals, called agency conflicts. This issue of principal agent problem 
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is first proposed by Adam Smith in 1776 when he argued that the separation of 
ownership and control served as a poor motivation for managers to operate the firm 
efficiently. Agency relationship arises when principals hired agents to carry out a 
specific tasks on their behalf which involves giving decision-making power to the 
agents. One of the main agency relationships in business is between stockholders and 
managers. Figure 2 presents the basic idea of agency theory. 
Figure 2: BASIC IDEA OF AGENCY 
self interes® •••@elf interest 
In a study by Claessens and Fan (2002), it is found that agency problems 
differs in Asia compared to in UK and US where ownership structures are prevalent 
in Asia leading to a conflict of interest between controlling owners and minority 
shareholders while it is between outside shareholders and managers in a diffuse 
owner hip in U.K and U.S. 
Two common forms of the principal-agent problems are moral hazard and 
adverse selection (Chung et aI., 2006). Moral hazard or self-interested behaviour is 
the basic problem in an organization and is often resulted from asymmetric 
infonnation. Moral hazard describes the managers as the agents who aim to 
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maximise their own benefit and welfare at the cost of corporate shareholders who 
act as the principal in an imperfect labour and capital markets. Therefore, the 
incapability of shareholders to monitor the true quality of management lead to the 
problem of adverse selection, which undermine the true value of the firm. As 
mentioned earlier, information asymmetry between agents and principals lead to 
agency theory which caused agency costs to increase. 
A. Agency Costs 
Agency costs which are the expenses incurred to maintain an effective agency 
relationship are likely to increase as a result from reducing moral hazard. There are 
costs borne by the agent in performing the action and by the principal in providing 
compensation in addition to the costs of monitoring the behaviour of the agent. 
According to agency theory, by improving corporate governance can help to align 
interests between agents and principals which lead to a decrease in agency costs. A 
reduction in agency costs can possibly improved the performance of better governed 
companies. Therefore, agency theory has became a leading model in the financial 
economics literature. 
B. Information Asymmetry 
Generally, it is assumed that both principal and agent do not have the same 
levels of information, thus the agent can easily take advantage of the situation. 
Besides than observing their own actions, agents also might have knowledge which 
81 Pag e 
is not possessed by the principal about other factors that lead to the results preferred 
by the principal. This situation is known as moral hazard and is often resulted from 
asymmetric information. Information asymmetry describes the inability of the 
principal to properly assess the extent to which the agent chooses an action that 
coincides with the principal's best interests. Incentives are created by the principals 
for the agents as they will face the information asymmetry and risks despite to 
whether the agents has successfully accomplished their tasks. 
Figure 3:CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LIQUIDITY 
, 
BOARD 
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Reduces information I 
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Reduces volatility 
According to Prasanna & Menon (2011), compames with higher level of 
corporate governance leads to a decrease in information asymmetry while improving 
stock market liquidity due to increase in quality and quantity of information 
disclosures to investors as shown in Figure 3. 
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1.3.2. Conceptual Framework 
Figure 4: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ACCESS 
TO FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
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1.4 Background- Malaysia Scenario 
1.4.1 Malaysia Corporate Governance 
According to Zulkafli et. al (nd), the discussion on Corporate Governance in 
Malaysia as well as other East Asian countries started from the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997 which has caused the East Asia~ economies to collapse. The event 
resulted in greater concern and recognition of Corporate Governance to the public 
and private sector in those countries. Therefore, like other economies in East Asia, 
Corporate Governance had also been actively promoted in the Malaysian corporate 
sector after the crisis. Measures had been taken to improve the aspects of fairness, 
transparency, accountability and responsibility in operating the organizations. There 
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were two types of governance codes: governance codes which linked or legally 
mandated disclosure requirement and governance codes that were purely voluntary 
in nature but may be designed to help forestall further government or listing body 
regulation. 
Figure 5: MALAYSIA CG REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
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Corporate governance (CG) framework in Malaysia is obtained from the Bursa 
Malaysia website. By implementing corporate governance, premium brands are 
placed by investors on companies with excellent CG practices. Hence, listed issuers 
will stand out, be uniquely valuable, notable among their competitors and attract the 
investing community. In the Regulator's perspective, the convergence of CG 
standards to global best practices and transparency pennits regulatory hannonization 
bringing greater cross-border activities and the confidence of investors. 
Bursa Malaysia plays a big part in developing Malaysia's CG standard 
practices of listed issuers in distinguishing the CG importance in the global capital 
market context. Besides than being acknowledged as a leading and established 
market, a capital market is required to be well-regulated from an investor protection 
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viewpoint and also meet the international benchmarks in terms of standards of CG 
practices in order to be globally competitive and at the same level with international 
jurisdiction. 
Corporate governance in Malaysia is normally regulated by the following laws, rules 
and regulations: 
~ the Corporate Governance Code; 
~ the Listing Requirements; 
~ the Companies Act; 
~ the Securities Industry Act; 
~ the Securities Commission Act 1993; and 
~ the Futures Industry Act 1993. 
With the introduction of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance in 
2000, it is expected that companies would be more aware of the need to have good 
governance and that good governance would lead to enhanced transparency. This is 
proved by (Ghazali, 2010) who studied the relationship between corporate 
governance and voluntary disclosure. The extent of voluntary disclosure has 
increased from 2001 to 2006 consistent with expectation. However contrary to 
expectation, none of the corporate governance variables recommended in the Code 
was statistically significant. 
As mentioned earlier, corporate governance helps to increase board 
effectiveness and disclosure requirements which results in better quality and quantity 
of information made available to investors (La Porta et aI., 2000; Prasanna & 
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